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ABSTRACT
Open source software (OSS), a form of Digital or Knowledge Commons, underlies much of
the technology that we use in our daily lives. The existence and continuation of OSS relies
on the contribution of private resources – personal time, volunteer energy, and effort of
numerous actors (e.g., software developers’ time as a common-pool resource) – to public
goods, the benefits of which are enjoyed by everyone. Nonprofit organizations such as
the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) attempt to aid this process by providing various
collective services to OSS projects, acting as a second-order actor in the production of
the public good. To this end, the ASF Incubator has created policies – essentially rules
or norms – that serve to protect its interests and, as they say, increase the sustainability
of the projects. Each policy requires investment by ASF (in terms of money or the use
of volunteer time) or an incubating project (in terms of taking project personnel time),
the benefits of which can accrue to either party. Such policies may impose additional
costs on incubating projects, leading to a decreased production of the OSS public good.
Using the ASF Incubator policy documents, we construct a dataset that records who –
ASF or an incubating project – bears the cost and who enjoys the benefit of each policy
and procedure. We can code most policy statements as costing one party and benefiting
one party. The distribution of costs and benefits according to party indicates whether the
second-order actor is contributing to an increase in the public good and if they are doing
so sustainably. Through a two-way ANOVA, we characterize the impact of ASF policies
on the production of public goods (OSS). Being a part of ASF imposes some costs on
projects, but these costs may make projects more sustainable. Our analysis shows that
the distribution of costs and benefits is fairly symmetric between the ASF and incubating
projects. Thus, the configuration of policies or the “institutional design” of the ASF could
aid in producing the OSS public good by providing services that projects require.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Open source software (OSS) underlies much of the
technology that we use on a regular basis – from bank
transfers, to streaming movies, to online shopping. While
hard to formalize, one recent European Union study
estimated that the economic impact of OSS on the EU
economy in 2018 was somewhere between 65 and 95
billion Euros (Leprince-Ringuet, 2021).
To produce OSS, groups of developers act collectively to
create software that are licensed in such a way that they
become public goods (Benkler, 2008; Schweik and English,
2012). Traditionally, in these forms of digital or knowledge
commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2007; Schweik and English,
2013; Alonso de Magdaleno and Garcia-Garcia, 2015), one
or more people create OSS by coming up with an idea for
a software product, prototyping a solution and, through
the use of copyright licensing and the internet, sharing
their software solution with other people both for adoption
and to encourage additional development (Free Software
Foundation, 2021). Developers have multiple reasons for
contributing to projects including: their own need for the
OSS or the need of the software by their employer; the
desire to learn and improve skills through reading the
code and interacting with other OSS developers; publicly
showcasing their programming ability to others; and, for
some, a philosophical commitment to the idea of OSS
(Lakhani and Wolf, 2003; David and Shapiro, 2008; Schweik
and English, 2012). In effect, this time that developers are
seeking to contribute to the production of OSS becomes
a common-pool resource from which any OSS project
could harvest developer time (non-excludable) that is not
available to other projects after it has been used (rivalrous).
This has been called the “volunteer energy” common-pool
resource in the literature (Brudney and Meijs, 2009).
Software developers produce OSS by contributing their
time to creating software that can be freely used by all.
Once OSS is produced, it is hosted online and, depending
on the particulars of its associated copyright license, it
can be used by a new user no matter how many other
people are currently using it (i.e., it is non-rivalrous).
Furthermore, no one can be prevented from using it (thus,
it is non-excludable). This makes OSS a classic public good
(V. Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977). The OSS system, therefore,
has two sets of “commonly-held” resources: the rivalrous
common-pool resource of developer energy and the nonrivalrous public good of the software products themselves.
In the early days of OSS, small groups of like-minded
individuals would come together to work on a project
of mutual interest. These self-governing projects were
left to their own devices for survival, trying to maintain
development and grow a user base on their own, operating
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under idiosyncratic norms and rules (Schweik and English,
2012). In the last 20 years, organizations have emerged as
second-order actors in the production of OSS. They provide
various collective services to aid OSS projects, such as legal,
technical, and financial support (Riehle and Berschneider,
2012). A recent paper by Izquierdo and Cabot (2020)
reports over 100 OSS nonprofit foundations exist today
offering differing levels of support services. The Apache
Software Foundation (ASF) – the focal nonprofit in this
study – is one of the oldest such organizations with one
of the largest numbers of associated OSS projects. A key
service the ASF provides is the “incubation of podlings”,1
which is a mechanism and social process within the
foundation to nurture OSS projects that are interested
in becoming a project formally associated with the ASF.
To achieve their goal of integrating new projects into the
ASF community, the ASF Incubator program has created
policies or requirements that protect both ASF’s interests
and, according to Apache, make OSS projects more
sustainable (Khudairi, 2019).
This represents an additional layer in the collective
action problem of creating and maintaining OSS. Such
nonprofits organize developer time with the aim of
producing “sustainable” OSS projects. In the context of
OSS, a project is sustainable if it continues to build a userbase of the product and a contributor-base to the project.2
The nonprofit organizations provide guidance and establish
requirements, policies or rules that incubating OSS projects
wishing to fall under their umbrella must follow. From their
perspective, they very well may have established the policies
that they require podlings to comply with to streamline
collective-action behavior within the OSS project based on
other OSS developer’s experience – the people running the
ASF incubator program – in growing successful, sustainable
projects. However, the people involved in the podling
(the developers), may change the distribution of how
they invested their time prior to entering the foundation
compared to after due to these new policies, rules, and
requirements. For instance, joining ASF may require some
OSS contributors who had previously worked as developers
on the project pre-incubation to switch part of their time
toward efforts focused on interfacing with the foundation
instead of developing software code for the specific project.
OSS developers sometimes refer to this change in time
allocation as a result of joining the ASF Incubator as the
foundation “tax” (ASF, 2021c). This could also be seen as a
transaction cost of incubation.
This relates the analysis of such foundations to the study
of nonprofit organizations that gather individual donations
(a common-pool resource; see Brudney and Meijs, 2009) to
contribute to a public good such as environmental quality
(Grant and Langpap, 2019). Whether or not nonprofit
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organizations efficiently contribute to the production of
public goods has long been of interest (Sugden, 1984;
Roberts, 1987). Most existing research looks at individual
motivations for contributing resources to what may be
termed the “fundraising commons” (MacQuillin, 2015),
though recent work has also examined if nonprofits are
able to efficiently harvest from this common-pool resource
to produce public goods (Grant and Langpap, 2019).
With all of this in mind, the key overarching question
that we address in this paper is: How can second-order
actors harvest from a common-pool resource (developers’
and other contributors’ time) to positively contribute to the
creation of a public good? To this end, we analyze the policies
or rules placed by ASF on entering OSS projects and use
qualitative methods to study the cost-benefit distribution of
these policies.3 On the one hand, the developers associated
with the entering podling could completely absorb the
costs – time and effort – of complying with the incubator
rules, and ASF could receive all the benefits of abiding
by those rules, as they would have a high-quality project
associated with their nonprofit. This would represent ASF
harvesting from the common-pool of OSS developer time
in order to grow itself as an organization rather than the
public good. Alternatively, the costs for implementing rules
could fall largely on the role of the actors running the ASF
Incubator, and the developers with the incubating podlings
could be reaping all the benefits. In this case, ASF would be
contributing to the public good independent of developers’
contributions. Yet another possibility is that the costs and
benefits are evenly distributed between the OSS podlings
and ASF Incubator. Our findings provide support for a
fairly symmetric cost-benefit distribution between the two
parties.
The question of who incurs the costs and benefits of
incubator rules is of significance as the model of OSS projects
associating with an overarching nonprofit is widespread
(Izquierdo and Cabot, 2020). Thus, understanding how
operational requirements help or hinder each side can
provide valuable insights into whether an incubation
program works well or not. This paper adds to the existing
literature that explores the factors that influence the costs
and benefits of contributing to OSS, such as the motivations
that guide participation in social movements (Hertel et
al., 2003) and the adoption of new software (Islam et al.,
2017).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides a brief background of the ASF Incubator and
describes the conceptual framework of our analysis.
Section 3 looks at the data and methods used in our
analysis. Section 4 and Section 5 describe our findings and
their implications. Section 6 draws some conclusions and
provides thoughts on future research possibilities.

2 BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
2.1 BACKGROUND ON ASF AND THE ASF
INCUBATOR

According to ASF’s overview webpage (ASF, 2021d), the
mission of the organization established in 1999 is to
provide software for the public good, through the provision
of services and support to software projects “… consisting
of individuals who choose to participate in ASF activities.”
OSS projects “in the wild” that either request or ASF recruits
to join the organization receive services and guidance
from experienced OSS developers and ASF members on
intellectual property (e.g., copyright licensing), financial
contributions that help reduce legal exposure for OSS
project developers, access to ASF technical resources, as
well as project specific mentorship by experienced software
developers who are ASF members with an eye toward
longer-term project sustainability. OSS projects who ASF
admits as incubating projects are required to abide by ASF’s
policies and incubation rules, thus giving up some of their
operational freedom to comply with the so-called “Apache
Way” policies (ASF, 2021b).
Established in 2002, the ASF Incubator acts as the entry
point for OSS projects that wish to be a part of the ASF. The
main roles of the Incubator are to help incoming projects
adopt Apache’s principles of governance and operation
as well as guide them to successful graduation out of
the Incubator to become full-fledged “top-level projects”
that are formally associated with the ASF. According to
the Apache Incubator website, as of November 2019, this
program has helped 315 incoming OSS projects of which at
least 200 of them have graduated (ASF, 2021a).
The ASF adds several layers of management to the
collective action problem of creating and maintaining OSS
compared to OSS projects “in the wild”. Projects are hosted
within the Incubator, which itself is a top-level project under
the ASF umbrella. Consequently, the Incubator has its own
Project Management Committee (PMC) who oversee its
activities. ASF allows projects (both graduated OSS projects
and the Incubator) to bring on new members to their
PMCs through a vote of the PMC members on that project
– and the Incubator is no different. Uniquely, however,
the Incubator PMC approves all ASF member requests
to be added to the Incubator PMC. But membership
to the ASF is invite-only and via election, and typically
reflects an enduring commitment to the principles of OSS
development adhered to by Apache. Members ensure the
continued success of ASF and are from where the ASF Board
of Directors are drawn. This means that OSS development
within the Incubator in ASF consists of multiple levels of
collective action: contributions to individual projects, the
Incubator, and the ASF at large.
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2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
Economic analyses of regulations often use quantitative
assessments of costs and benefits to determine if they
will improve the overall welfare of the society. While this
type of analysis has been commonly used for environment,
health, and safety (EHS) regulations (OMB, 2020), similar
frameworks have also been proposed for financial
regulations (Siegel et al., 2009; Posner and Weyl, 2013). In
this paper, we adapt the cost-benefit framework to allow
for a qualitative analysis of the policy statements that
govern the incubation process of the ASF.
Nonprofit organizations such as the ASF aim to aid with
the sustainability of the OSS commons by providing projects
with a variety of services that could help them survive and
even thrive. In exchange, however, the Incubator expects
projects to abide by certain policies and procedures that
the organization has in place. These policies require some
investment of time or other resources – costs – by either the
project or ASF, the benefits of which could accrue to either
party. How the parties distribute costs and benefits could
have important implications not only for the sustainability

of the OSS commons but also for the necessity and survival
of the nonprofit organization itself. By using cost-benefit
tables, we can summarize these distributions and gain a
better understanding of how ASF organizes OSS production.
Additionally, the cost-benefit distributions could provide us
with insights on whether the incubation requirements of
the ASF incentivizes continuous contributions to the OSS
commons, thus resolving the collective action problem of
maintaining the public good of OSS, or adds to the costs of
producing OSS, thus making the collective action problem
more acute. A balance between the costs and benefits
accrued from following policies designed to protect natural
resource commons is found to have important implications
for encouraging participation in collective action (Cox et al.,
2010). Given the similarities between the OSS commons
and a natural resource commons in terms of incentives
to contribute, we expect that organizations that aim to
resolve this collective action problem will need to follow
similar principles while designing their policies.
Figure 1 provides a set of hypothetical distributions of the
costs and benefits of policy statements between the two
parties: (1) the incubating project and (2) ASF officials who

Figure 1 Alternative distributions of costs and benefits of policy statements.
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are affiliated with the ASF Incubator (hereafter referred
to simply as “ASF”). In Panel A, incubating projects incur
a significant majority of the costs but also receive most of
the benefits. Meanwhile in Panel B, we have the opposite
scenario where ASF bears most of the costs but also enjoys
most of the benefits of its policies. In both these instances
it is unlikely that there are many contributions being made
to sustain the overall OSS commons as each party is mainly
engaging in activities that benefit itself. Furthermore, such
a distribution of costs and benefits of policies may not be
favorable for the existence of long-term relations between
projects and the ASF as one party is far more invested in the
process than the other. For instance, when ASF bears most
of the costs and also enjoys most of the benefits (Panel B),
projects may be more likely to leave the Incubator sooner as
they neither are benefiting much from it, nor do they have
much to lose in terms of resources invested. Conversely,
when projects undertake most of the costs and also benefit
significantly more from the policies, the ASF can easily shirk
from its responsibilities without many losses.
Panel C illustrates a scenario that is fairly similar to
Panels A and B. Here, the diagonal elements are more
balanced indicating that the party that has incurred the
cost of a policy is also likely to enjoy its benefits. However,
in this case too, the nonprofit’s policies may not help in
sustaining the OSS commons as the actors are primarily
involved in activities that directly benefit themselves. This
could also reflect a situation where each party is mainly
interested in protecting their own interests.
In Panel D, we observe the exact opposite of the
above cases. In this case, it is the off-diagonal cells that
contain most of the policy statements. This implies that
when projects incur the costs of a policy, it is very likely
that its benefits accrue to the ASF and vice versa. Such a
distribution of costs and benefits establishes a pattern of
mutual obligations between the two parties and possibly
encourages risk sharing.
In Panels E and F, we observe two extreme cases of
altruism. In the first instance, projects bear most of the
costs of policies, the benefits of which accrue to the ASF.
This distribution of costs and benefits could adversely
impact the production of the OSS public good. In such a
scenario, projects spend significant resources complying
with policies that do not benefit them instead of engaging
in activities that directly lead to the creation of more, higher
quality, or more sustainable OSS. In Panel F, it is the ASF
that incurs the majority of the costs of its policies for the
benefit of the incubating projects. While this arrangement
may be beneficial for ensuring the sustainability of the
OSS commons, it may not be feasible for the ASF to persist
in the long run under such an allocation of costs and
benefits.

The final panel illustrates a scenario where the costs
and benefits of policies are evenly divided between the
ASF and incubating projects. Such an allocation could be
an indication that the nonprofit organization has policies
and procedures in place to provide projects with skills
and resources that they need but do not possess. At the
same time, ASF gives projects the freedom to engage in
activities that they do best without requiring them to
divert significant amounts of resources towards complying
with policy requirements. From an overall perspective,
such a distribution of costs and benefits could aid in the
sustainability of the OSS commons.

3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 DATA

The dataset for this paper has been constructed using
publicly available policy documents of the Apache
Software Foundation Incubator (ASF, 2021a). There are a
total of eight policy documents in our dataset. The sources
of the original documents can be found in Table A1 in the
Appendix. These documents are briefly described below:
i.		
Incubation Policy: An overarching reference on
the policies and procedures used in the incubation
process.
ii.		The Apache Incubator Cookbook: A document that
helps podlings – software projects in incubation –
determine if joining the ASF Incubator is a good fit for
them or not.
iii.		Podling Project Management Committee (PPMC)
guide: Guidance on the role of the PPMC that supports
each podling in incubation to learn how to govern
itself and how they interact with the ASF.
iv.		Guide to Successful Community Building: Information
to podlings emphasizing the importance of building
a community to support the project and providing
guidelines on how to bring in new developers
(“committers”) and PPMC members as well as how to
encourage increased community engagement.
v.		Release Management guide: A release in OSS is
making a new version of the software available to
the public. This document outlines the rules that
podlings need to comply with related to building
ASF-compliant software releases.
vi.		Guide to Successful Graduation: Graduation from
the Incubator is the ultimate goal for the podlings,
meaning that they have proven themselves to the ASF
as a project with a high probability of being sustained
and that they understand the so-called “Apache
Way” of building community, and approaching
software development and release management.
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This document provides podlings with information on
what is expected for graduation and the process of
graduation.
vii.	
Guide to Retirement: A retired podling is one which
will no longer be associated with the incubation
program for various reasons. This policy document
describes retirement as a concept and as a process.
viii.	Mentors’ guide: This document provides rules and
guidelines for mentors on how to get a podling
operational with special attention to the technical
infrastructure (e.g., podling webpage, version control
system, etc.) to support it.
While these are not all the documents hosted on ASF’s
website that offer instructions for how podlings can
successfully go through the Incubator, they include all the
formal policy documents as well as the documents that
new podlings are directed to upon joining the Incubator.
Other documents primarily reorganize this information to
help podlings better understand the policies in place.
To construct our dataset, we first identified the
institutional statements present in each of the above
policy documents. We define an institutional statement
in accordance with the literature as a “shared linguistic
constraint or opportunity that prescribes, permits, or
advises actions or outcomes for actors (both individual and
corporate)” (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995, 583; see Table 3
for examples of institutional statements). We identify the
operational-level institutional statements, which are
policies that deal with day-to-day processes and functions
(E. Ostrom, 2009). Such statements comprise the majority
(approximately 90-95 percent) of identified institutional
statements across the ASF Incubator policy documents.4
Our final dataset has a total of 259 operational-level
statements. We summarize the distribution of these
operational statements among the policy documents in
Table 1.

3.2 METHODS
As the first step in our analysis, we classified the institutional
statements in our dataset based on three attributes:
i. Focus Area: Using the grounded theory approach
proposed by Glaser and Strauss (2017), we categorize
each institutional statement into one of the following
focus areas – risk mitigation, infrastructure, release
management, project governance, Apache governance,
roles and responsibilities, graduation criteria,
communication, prerequisites, and Apache protection.
These areas were identified by reading the policy
documents, collecting recurring themes, and agreeing
on them before coding individual statements. The
definitions for these focus areas can be found in Table 2.
ii. Benefit: Institutional statements are categorized as
benefiting the ASF (OSS project) if the majority of the
benefits from the policy accrue to ASF (OSS project).
iii. Cost: Institutional statements are categorized as
costing the ASF (OSS project) if the majority of the costs
from the policy are borne by ASF (OSS project).
We base the assessment of “the majority of benefits”
and “the majority of costs” on an in-depth understanding
of the workings of the ASF Incubator. We arrived at
this understanding through reading a large number of
emails, reports that projects file regularly, reports that the
Incubator files with the ASF, reviewing presentations given
by experienced Incubator members to new incubating
projects, and extensive one-on-one discussions with
experienced members of the ASF.
It is important to note that this coding answers two
questions independently: (i) Does it cost ASF or the podling
more to comply with this policy? (ii) Does this policy benefit
ASF more or the podling? – and not the single question: Does
ASF benefit more than it costs them and is that benefit more
or less than the podlings? Furthermore, we are concerned

POLICY DOCUMENT

NO. OF OPERATIONAL STATEMENTS

The Apache Incubator Cookbook

51

Guide to Successful Graduation

49

Podling Project Management Committee guide

42

Mentors’ guide

34

Incubation Policy

28

Guide to Successful Community Building

26

Release Management guide

25

Guide to Retirement

4

Table 1 Distribution of operational statements across policy documents.
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FOCUS AREA

DEFINITION

risk mitigation

Policies designed to make projects more sustainable

infrastructure

Policies describing technical rules of how to do things

release management

Policies describing how to make Apache-compliant code releases

project governance

Policies describing how things are done in a project

Apache governance

Policies describing how things are done in Apache

roles and responsibilities

Policies describing the duties of people occupying certain positions

graduation criteria

Requirements to graduate out of the Incubator

communication

Policies governing the exchange of information

prerequisites

Requirements to occupy a particular position

Apache protection

Policies designed to protect Apache from potential issues (legal, etc.)

Table 2 Definitions of focus areas.

INSTITUTIONAL STATEMENT

POLICY DOCUMENT

FOCUS AREA

COST

BENEFIT

“Each podling in incubation must report to the incubator PMC (Project
Management Committee).”

Incubator Policy

risk mitigation

project

ASF

“A major criterion for graduation is to have developed an open and diverse
meritocratic community.”

Graduation Guide

graduation criteria

project

project

Table 3 Coding examples of operational statements.

only with the marginal cost of each operational-level policy
statement, not the total cost of being able to get to that
policy statement (e.g., we do not incorporate the cost to
ASF for maintaining a Board of Directors into judgments
regarding infrastructural requirements). Table 3 provides a
few examples of coded policy statements to illustrate this
process in greater detail.
The first statement in Table 3 describes the reporting
requirements for incubating projects. We classify the focus
area of this statement as risk mitigation as the objective
of this policy is to ensure that any issues projects are
facing are brought to the attention of Apache in a timely
manner. The majority of the costs of this policy is borne
by the incubating project (podling) as it has to file a report
that meets ASF’s requirements. The primary beneficiary of
this policy is the ASF Incubator as these reports keep them
apprised of any changes in the projects, thus allowing the
ASF to encourage projects to retire or graduate in a timely
way. While ASF also incurs costs to review a report (i.e., find
mentors for a project, setup reporting infrastructure, read
the report, etc.), we are concerned only with the marginal
cost of this policy. Most of the costs borne by the ASF
are contained in policies establishing them, such as the
requirement for podlings to have mentors.
The second statement outlines an objective that projects
need to meet in order to graduate out of the Incubator.

Graduation criteria is the focus area for this statement.
Both the costs and benefits of this policy accrue to the
incubating projects (podlings). Projects have to invest the
time to build a community of contributors who are not all
affiliated to a single company. However, they also enjoy the
benefit of having such a community as they are no longer
dependent on the time and interest of a single contributor
or company for survival.
Two independent coders carried out this classification of
operational statements. They subsequently resolved coding
discrepancies in a separate discussion where the coders
agreed on a common classification. After initial coding,
Krippendorf’s alpha (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007; Hughes,
2021) was 0.66 (95% confidence interval = [0.63, 0.69]),
which can be deemed “substantial” agreement. Following
discussion, there remained only one disagreement out of
1,405 coded statements.
Once coded, we organized our data into 2 × 2 tables
with each cell denoting the parties to which the costs and
benefits accrue (see below, Tables 4-9 and Tables A2–A14
in the Appendix). We then analyze whether there exists a
relationship between which party incurs the cost and which
receives the benefit. In other words, is the column (benefit)
in which a case is independent from which row (cost) it is in.
Despite the high level of agreement between coders
and a coding process that uses extensive knowledge of
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Apache and projects to reach a final classification, we
recognize that it is possible that other researchers could
disagree on the assessment of which party takes on the
costs or enjoys the benefits of any particular operational
institutional statement. Consequently, we provide a
measure of robustness for each finding (R). To calculate R,
we generate a hypothetical table with the fewest number
of changes in the cells that will produce the opposite result
(e.g., make a non-significant result significant), and the
number of changes is then divided by the total number
of cases. The resulting R is the share of total cases that
would need to change to give the opposite result. If this
value is small, then it is possible that other researchers
coding costs and benefits may generate a different
finding. If this value is large, however, we have confidence
that the finding is robust to mis-coding and legitimate
disagreements.
Using the organized 2 × 2 tables, we can analyze our
coded operational statements to determine whether there
exists a dependency between which party incurs the costs
and which party enjoys the benefits of these policies.
In our analysis of the overall distribution of institutional
statements, we use the chi-squared approximation of the
binomial distribution to determine the p-value and reach
a conclusion regarding statistical significance (Pearson,
1900). However, the chi-squared approximation diverges
substantially from the exact distribution when the number
of expected cases is less than five in one cell of the table,
which often occurs in our data given the small number
of cases in some tables. These instances call for an
exact test. Researchers frequently use Fisher’s exact test,
though that test is conditional: the p-values are calculated
assuming the row and column totals are known. When this
is not the case, the test is overly conservative (Barnard,
1947). Boschloo (1970) developed an unconditional test,
which has been found to have the best power of the
unconditional exact tests (Berger, 1994). As such, all results
presented here in which a cell of the table has fewer than
five expected cases or which have fewer than 50 cases use
the Boschloo exact test to derive the p-value. While the
p-value allows us to identify tables with dependency, it
breaks down in highly skewed tables. Specifically, tables in
which the multiplication of the diagonal elements and the
off-diagonal elements are both equal to 0 return a p-value
of 1. This, however, can hide interesting cases such as, if
all the benefits accrued to one party or one party bore all
the costs. Consequently, in addition to the p-value we add
our measure of robustness (R), which tells us the share
of statements from a given table that would need to be
coded differently to bring the p-value above or below 0.1,
as the case may be.

4 RESULTS

4.1 COSTS AND BENEFITS ACROSS ALL ASF
INCUBATION POLICY STATEMENTS
Table 4 summarizes the costs and benefits for all ASF

incubation policy statements. The chi-squared test
indicates no significant differences in the distribution of
costs and benefits. This implies that at the aggregate level,
the distribution of costs and benefits is almost symmetric
between the projects and ASF. With a R of 0.054, 14 policy
statements currently coded as costing the project and
benefiting the project would need to be distributed among
the other cells to bring the p-value below 0.1.

4.2 COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INDIVIDUAL
POLICY DOCUMENTS
In addition to the aggregate analysis shown in Table 4,
we undertook similar analyses of the distribution of costs
and benefits for each policy document individually. Most
documents show no evidence of a relationship between
the costs and benefits accrued to ASF and incubating
projects (see Tables A2–A6 in the Appendix). However,
there a few notable exceptions. From Table 5, we observe
that the distribution of costs and benefits of the policies in
the Release Management guide is not independent of the
parties. What sets this document apart from the others is
that the majority of its policy statements fall under one of
the off-diagonal classifications. This implies that when the
cost of a policy statement falls on the incubating project,

BENEFIT

Cost

TOTAL

PROJECT

ASF

project

101

60

161

ASF

59

39

98

160

99

259

Total

Table 4 Summary of costs and benefits of Apache incubation
policies.
Chi-squared test statistic = 0.075, p-value = 0.78, R = 0.054.

BENEFIT

Cost

Total

TOTAL

PROJECT

ASF

project

2

8

10

ASF

11

4

15

13

12

25

Table 5 Summary of costs and benefits of Release Management
guide.
Boschloo test statistic = 0.015, p-value = 0.01, R = 0.12.
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BENEFIT

Cost

TOTAL

PROJECT

ASF

project

26

0

26

ASF

0

0

0

26

0

26

Total

Table 6 Summary of costs and benefits of Guide to Successful
Community Building.
Boschloo test statistic = 1, p-value = 1, R = 0.12.

BENEFIT

Cost

Total

TOTAL

PROJECT

ASF

project

2

0

2

ASF

0

2

2

2

2

4

Table 7 Summary of costs and benefits of Guide to Retirement.
Boschloo test statistic = 0.33, p-value = 0.11, R = 1.

it is very likely that the benefits accrue to ASF. Conversely,
when ASF bears the cost of a policy statement, its benefits
likely go to incubating projects. The Release Management
guide establishes a pattern of mutual obligations (as
shown in Figure 1: Panel D) between ASF and projects, who
need to work together to make successful releases. With
an R of 0.12, 3 policy statements currently coded as costing
ASF and benefiting the project would need to be distributed
among the other cells to bring the p-value above 0.1.
Table 6 and 7 show distributions of costs and benefits
that match panels in Figure 1. The policy statements in
the Guide to Successful Community Building (Table 6) all
require the costs to be borne by the project and provide
the benefits to the project. This is an extreme example of
Panel A from Figure 1. The policy statements in the Guide
to Retirement (Table 7) are such that the party incurring the
cost also receives the benefit. This is an example of Panel C
from Figure 1. While this result is statistically insignificant,
this is only because the small number of policy statements
in this document barely prevents it from rising to a p-value
of 0.1.

4.3 COSTS AND BENEFITS BY FOCUS AREA
When we analyze the distribution of costs and
benefits by focus area – risk mitigation, infrastructure,
release management, project governance, Apache
governance, roles and responsibilities, graduation criteria,
communication, prerequisites, and Apache protection – we
find that in almost all cases there is no evidence supporting

BENEFIT

Cost

TOTAL

PROJECT

ASF

project

0

10

10

ASF

2

1

3

2

11

13

Total

Table 8 Summary of costs and benefits of Apache Protection
policies.
Boschloo test statistic = 0.039, p-value = 0.02, R = 0.62.

a relation with status as ASF or incubating project (see
Tables A7–A14 in the Appendix). There is one exception –
policies classified under the Apache protection category.
As shown in Table 8, the cost- benefit distribution of policy
statements in this focus area is not independent of ASF or
project status. This result arises as incubating projects do
not receive any benefits from the ten policy statements that
are found to impose a cost on them. The benefits of almost
all policies in this category accrue to Apache. This pattern is
very similar to what we observe in Panel E of Figure 1. With
an R of 0.62, 8 policy statements currently coded as costing
the project and benefiting ASF would need to be distributed
among the other cells to bring the p-value above 0.1.
In addition to this, one focus area matches a panel given
in Figure 1. Of the 10 policy statements that describe roles
and responsibilities, all of them benefit the project while 60
percent of them impose a cost on ASF. This is an example
of Panel F in Figure 1.
BENEFIT

Cost

TOTAL

PROJECT

ASF

project

4

0

4

ASF

6

0

6

10

0

10

Total

Table 9 Summary of costs and benefits of Roles and
Responsibilities.
Boschloo test statistic = 1, p-value = 1, R = 0.60.

5 DISCUSSION
When looking across all policy documents and topical areas,
the distribution of who incurs the cost of and who gets
the benefit from ASF Incubator policies is fairly symmetric
between ASF and incubating projects (Table 4). This is not
to say that ASF and projects have the same number of
policies in which they incur costs (98 and 161, respectively)
or benefits (99 and 160, respectively), but rather that who

73

Sen et al. International Journal of the Commons DOI: 10.5334/ijc.1176

gets the benefit is independent of who incurs the cost.
This distribution of costs and benefits matches Panel G
from Figure 1. From the digital or knowledge commons
perspective of OSS, this indicates that this policy regime
is likely aiding in the sustainability of the commons by
giving projects the freedom to engage in activities that
they do best at the expense of minimal resources while ASF
provides projects with skills and resources they need but
do not possess. Such a distribution of costs and benefits
allows a second-level actor to maximally contribute to the
OSS commons while ensuring their own sustainability. This
represents an efficient use of the common pool resource of
developer effort to produce the OSS public good.
At a finer scale, however, individual policy documents
have distributions of costs and benefits that are examples
of different dynamics illustrated in Figure 1. The Release
Management Guide (Table 5) is an example of Panel D,
where costs incurred by one party go to benefit the other
party. This establishes a pattern of mutual obligation
between the parties, which could encourage risk sharing.
The Guide to Successful Community Building (Table 6) is
an extreme example of Panel A, where one party incurs
all the costs and gets all the benefits. In isolation, such a
distribution would demonstrate a loose affiliation between
the involved parties. In this context, however, this highlights
ASF’s stated goals of helping projects grow communities,
the members of which do not necessarily participate
in the broader ASF community. The limited number of
statements in the Guide to Retirement (Table 7) resemble
the distribution in Panel C in Figure 1. Such a distribution
tells us that each party is acting in their own interest and
that the affiliation between parties is low. As retirement is
the process whereby a project leaves the Incubator either
through abandonment or via the community removing
it from ASF but continuing development in the wild,
this distribution reflects a situation where each party is
protecting themselves and their interests.
There are also researcher-derived focus areas whose
distribution of costs and benefits are examples of
dynamics shown in Figure 1. The Apache Protection focus
area (Table 8) captures all statements that are designed
to protect Apache from potential issues (legal, etc.). The
distribution of costs and benefits for these statements
closely matches Panel E, where the costs are largely borne
by projects and the benefits go to ASF. While in general
projects benefit from being associated with ASF, at the
operational level the onus to not abuse the ASF name and
its trademarks falls on projects, ensuring that ASF benefits
by being protected from potential issues such as lawsuits.
The Roles and Responsibilities focus area (Table 9) captures
statements that describe the roles of people occupying
certain positions. While it establishes roles that must be

staffed at both the project and ASF level (showing in the
near equal distribution of costs across the two parties),
the aim of all those roles is to help projects (meaning that
all benefits go to projects). This is an example of Panel F
from Figure 1, which, in isolation, would indicate complete
altruism on the part of ASF and might mean that the
organization is not sustainable. As these are part of a
larger body of policies, however, it does not indicate that
in general.

6 CONCLUSION
The existence and continuance of the OSS commons relies
on the conversion of a private good – developer time and
effort – to the collective public good of OSS. Contributors
have many reasons for doing so, ranging from a need
they have to a desire to learn or signal skill. This pool of
available developer time creates a common-pool resource
of “volunteer energy” (Brudney and Meijs, 2009). There
are now well over 100 non-profit organizations that aim
to organize the efforts of individual software developers
and “in the wild” OSS projects by bringing them under
their umbrella through programs like the ASF Incubator
(Izquierdo and Cabot, 2020). These programs provide OSS
projects with services and education that the nonprofit
sees as important for them to become sustainable (i.e.,
continued maintenance and development). However, the
nonprofit foundations also require the OSS projects and
the developers affiliated with them to comply with their
incubation policies and procedures. These policies and
procedures could be such that they draw from the common
pool resource of developer time to build the nonprofit,
leading to a decrease in the production of the OSS public
good. Thus, when a project decides to incubate with ASF,
developers divide their finite time between following new
rules established by ASF while also engaging in their regular
software development activities that directly contribute to
OSS creation. This could reduce the rate of production of
OSS, if a significant share of developer time shifts to rule
compliance without adequate benefits.
The switch in time allocation may affect the efficiency
of the OSS commons – how developers translate their
time into sustainable open source software (Sickles and
Zelenyuk, 2019). With developers dedicating more time to
complying with the policies and procedures of the software
foundations that they are a part of, less time is available
to activities more directly related to OSS development
and maintenance. In this manner, nonprofit foundations
that support OSS projects could affect the efficiency of
converting the common-pool resource of developer time
and effort to the public good of OSS, in that developers
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devote the same amount of time, but they produce less (or
less productive, or lower quality) OSS. On the other hand,
the additional cost of complying with these policies could
also be an investment in the future sustainability of the
project, meaning that time spent complying with policies
will ultimately lead to more (or more productive, or higher
quality) OSS.
In this paper, we develop a methodology to analyze
the institutional design of OSS incubator programs.
Specifically, we apply a cost-benefit analysis framework
to investigate whether the operational-level institutional
statements – the rules, policies and procedures – of the
ASF Incubator explicitly benefit the OSS projects or the ASF
Incubator program. Our results show that, at an aggregate
level, the distribution of costs and benefits of the ASF’s
incubation policies is approximately symmetric between
the projects and the Incubator. This result also holds
true for most individual policy documents related to the
incubation process as well as the identified focus areas
of the operational statements. Deviations from balanced
costs and benefits show interesting dynamics in different
parts of the relationship between ASF and projects, both
validating and showing the utility of this methodology.
For the ASF Incubator, this is a positive sign as these
findings demonstrate that the rules they have dynamically
created over time to guide their incubation program
appear to be relatively equal in terms of costs and
benefits accrued to ASF and to their incubating projects.
This could indicate a sense of fairness and collaboration
between the two parties towards the common goal
of OSS sustainability. At an overall level, the policies
and procedures of the ASF Incubator do not hinder the
efficiency with which developers create OSS and thus
represent an effective use of the common pool resource
of developer energy.
While this approach of coding helps us conduct a
qualitative analysis of the costs and benefits of the policies
of second-order actors involved in the commons, it is
subject to some limitations. In the absence of quantitative
estimates, we are unable to make more concrete
calculations of the costs that specific incubating projects
incur in complying with these policies and the subsequent
impact that this may have on their long-term success and
sustainability. We can envision several ways of countering
this such as, using the digital traces of OSS projects to look
at how the distribution of effort changes from engaging
with a second-order actor, and using surveys of developers
to estimate how the amount of time invested in complying
with policies changes over time. This method is also time
consuming as coding is done manually by at least two
independent researchers and requires consistency between

74

them. One way to overcome this is to use text analysis
methods that automate the coding of costs and benefits
of institutional statements. Such methods could build
on techniques that have been developed for institutional
grammar analysis (Rice et al., 2021).
From a broader perspective, this study raises the issue
of whether the relative balance of costs and benefits
of operational rules holds true for other nonprofit OSS
foundations. Is the balance between costs and benefits
of operational rules a factor that influences whether OSS
projects successfully graduate to completely affiliated
projects with other nonprofits? Or are OSS nonprofits
with incubator programs themselves more “successful”
if and when their incubation program rules are more
balanced from a cost and benefit perspective? These are
questions that we intend to investigate in the next stage
of our research. Additionally, we plan to quantify the costs
and benefits identified in our analysis using surveys of
incubating projects as well as data gathered from project
reports and email communications.
The approach of aggregating costs and benefits of
policies across parties can be used to study institutions
within a common-pool resource management regime as
well as compare across regimes. If there is a common-pool
resource with many second-order actors organizing and
restricting the action of lower-level actors, this method
could allow us to characterize the relative contribution
of each actor to the overall health of the commons. This
would allow one to make recommendations to lowerlevel actors regarding which second-order institutions
they may join. Additionally, we can develop a set of
metrics that consider the relative distribution of costs and
benefits (e.g., benefits to projects divided by costs incurred
by the second-order actor) to characterize how secondorder actors contribute to the health of the commons.
Such metrics could also be used to compare the effect of
second-order actors on different common-pool resource
management regimes.
Finally, from a methodological perspective, our analytic
approach provides a relatively low-cost way to assess the
distribution of costs and benefits for entire regulatory
frameworks which can be applied to other commons
settings as well. Determining the balance of costs and
benefits for each individual policy (e.g., rules or norms)
and then aggregating across them allows us to assess
the burden of compliance with these institutional or
regulatory requirements. This method may be especially
useful in evaluating large regulatory frameworks that have
emerged over time. The costs and benefits of new rules
and regulations are typically measured on a piecemeal
basis when the regulations are proposed (Hahn, 2004).
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When a regulatory or institutional framework is built
this way, imbalances in the distribution of costs and
benefits that seem small for each policy may add up to
unduly benefit one party at the expense of the other. By
evaluating the entire institutional regime at once, this
method allows us to evaluate the fairness of large-scale
regulatory frameworks.
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